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Abstract 
 
This paper discusses some of the challenges that organizations face when implementing 
enterprise systems. A small-medium sized enterprise within a large conglomerate within the 
Asia-Pacific region was studied using critical ethnography. In this study it was found that 
organizational learning around strategically important issues failed to occur. This paper 
suggests the theory of organizational defensive routines for understanding how 
organizational learning may be hindered during the implementation of enterprise systems. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper discusses some of the challenges that organizations face when implementing 
enterprise systems. In particular, we focus on how organizational learning around 
strategically important issues may fail to occur. This paper contributes to the literature on the 
implementation of enterprise systems and to the literature on IS implementation failure more 
generally (Larsen et al. 1999; Myers 1994; Sauer 1999).   
 
There were many political issues surrounding the development and implementation of the 
enterprise system. In this organization, enterprise integration was a corporate battle ground – 
it was the issue over which a political conflict between two camps was fought. Our analysis 
shows that the new ERP system was designed to support a future corporate world and work 
environment that never arrived. The strategic assumptions that had driven the dream of 
enterprise integration were no longer valid just a few years later. Issues that could have been 
debated productively were not because of the failure to overcome organizational defensive 
routines.   
 
The organization was a small-to-medium sized enterprise within a large conglomerate within 
the Asia-Pacific region, called Stark (all names are pseudonyms in accordance with a 
confidentiality agreement). Stark was one of many subsidiaries within the Solteria group (one 
of the global 500 companies with annual revenues of more than US$4 billion). One of the 
authors studied Stark using critical ethnography.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we review the research literature on 
enterprise systems. In Section 3 we discuss our theoretical framework. Section 4 explains our 
research method. In Section 5 we present our data on the history of enterprise integration at 
Stark. Section 6 analyzes the data. The final section is the conclusion.  
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2. Literature Review 
 
Defining Enterprise Systems 
ERP systems, or “enterprise systems” for short, have been defined as “comprehensive, 
packaged software solutions [that] seek to integrate the complete range of a business’ 
processes and functions in order to present a holistic view of the business from a single 
information and IT architecture” (Gable 1998). In practice, however, companies with 
multiple sites may have different ERP configurations (Bhattacherjee 2000; Markus et al. 
2000a). The conglomerate we studied, for example, was a large, highly diversified 
international conglomerate. Its various subsidiaries had over a dozen different ERP systems 
from all the major vendors! In this kind of situation, the concept of one tightly integrated 
package for the entire enterprise is not feasible (although it may be feasible for individual 
companies within the conglomerate to have one ERP system). 
 
A somewhat broader definition of ERP is offered by Shanks and Seddon (2000). Focusing 
more on the shared information and data flows that enable integration of enterprise-wide 
processes, they define ERP as: “comprehensive packaged software solutions that integrate 
organizational processes through shared information and data flows.”  
 
Enterprise Systems Implementation 
Recent research has emphasized the importance of the social, cultural and organizational 
aspects in ERP implementation (e.g., Krumbholz et al. 2001; Larsen et al. 1999; Lee et al. 
2003; Markus et al. 2000b; Soh et al. 2000). For example, Hanseth and Braa (1999) studied 
the ability of one organization to change after the ERP had been implemented. They found 
that the dream of standardization was like “hunting for the treasure at the end of the rainbow” 
(Hanseth et al. 1999, p. 121). Other IS researchers have focused specifically on the role of 
power and politics in ERP implementations (Allen et al. 2001; Koch 2001). 
 
There are several ways enterprise systems may support, enable or constrain certain corporate 
strategic initiatives (Davenport 2000b; Markus et al. 2000b). For example, SAP assumes a 
translation from strategy to strategic objectives to key performance indicators to the key 
processes that are in turn supported by the SAP system (SAP 2001). This translation is 
assumed to be one way, from strategy to processes. In SAP’s worldview, the relationship 
between strategy, critical success factors, general (key) performance indicators, measurable 
performance indicators, processes and sub-processes is central to the implementation of an 
enterprise system. This is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
In analyzing the relationship between strategy and business processes, SAP has been 
influenced by Porter’s value chain (Porter et al. 1985). In Figure 2, for example, SAP 
promotes the benefits of an enterprise systems implementation by using Porter’s value chain 
concept. 
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Figure 1 - Relationship between Strategy, Strategic Objectives, Critical Success Factors, General (Key) 
Performance Indicators and Measurable Performance Indicators (adapted from SAP, 2001) 
 
Thus we can see that certain strategic paradigms have permeated the way enterprise systems 
are implemented. Enterprise systems are often seen as a means of implementing corporate 
strategy (e.g., Bhattacherjee 2000; Davenport 2000a; Markus et al. 2000b).  
 
However, while some researchers have acknowledged that changes in strategy are to be 
expected in the longer term (Davenport 2000a; Larsen et al. 1999),  few researchers in IS 
have looked at the power struggles that may take occur when a company’s strategy and in 
particular its enterprise integration strategy is formed and changes. In the organization we 
studied, as the dominant actors, coalitions, and political agendas changed over time, so too 
did the company’s enterprise integration strategy. Potentially, this throws into question the 
value of a one-way translation from strategy to processes that is assumed by some ERP 
vendors. 
 
Our research shows that the company’s enterprise integration strategy was a corporate 
battleground. Within the context of this corporate battleground, organizational defensive 
routines hindered the achievement of better understanding between parties to resolve 
strategically important issues. It is this failure to learn that is the focus of this paper.  
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Figure 2 - SAP’s and Cap Gemini Consulting’s View of How Porter’s Value Chain Relates to Benefits 
that Can Come from an ERP project (adapted from SAP 2001) 
 
3. Theoretical Background 
We decided to analyse the failure to learn during the implementation of this enterprise system 
using the theory of organizational defensive routines developed by Argyris and Schon (1978; 
1996). The theory of defensive routines has been used in the organizational learning 
movement (Argyris et al. 1996; Kim 1993; Senge 1990), in general management (Senge 
1990), and system dynamics (Sterman 2000). A few researchers have also used this theory in 
information systems (Henfridsson et al. 2000; Sallaway 1987). 
Organizational defensive routines is based on the theory of action perspective (Argyris et al. 
1978; Argyris et al. 1996). Argyris and Schon (1974; 1978) based this perspective in part on 
Bateson’s (1972) four levels of learning. However, Argyris and Schon (1978) have adopted 
only three of the four levels of learning: single loop, double loop and deutero learning 
(learning to learn). 
 
Within the theory of action perspective an organization has a theory of action that consists of 
norms, strategies and assumptions. For example, a sugar cane refinery would have strategies 
that provide the rationale for harvesting cane instead of buying it from an intermediary. It 
would also have norms for performance such as a 15 percent per annum growth rate. Also, 
there would be assumptions that harvesting and processing sugar cane in a particular manner 
will be the most cost-effective way to conduct business. (Note that the term “strategy” used 
within the theory of action perspective differs slightly from the other notions of corporate 
strategy (e.g., Porter 1996). We will clearly distinguish this by using the term “theory-of-
action strategy”).  
 
Single loop learning occurs when correction is done to the process through changes in theory-
of-action strategies and/or assumptions but the norms do not undergo change. Double loop 
learning, on the other hand, involves changes in norms as well as perhaps theory-of-action 
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strategies or assumptions whereas deutero learning involves learning how to learn. Put in 
another way, single loop learning does not involve a change in the master program (or the 
governing values mentioned below) that causes the organization to perpetuate errors but 
double loop learning does (Argyris 1993). 
 
Organizational defensive routines are: “actions or policies that prevent individuals or 
segments of the organisation from experiencing embarrassment or threat. Simultaneously, 
they prevent people from identifying and getting rid of the causes of the potential 
embarrassment or threat. Organisational defensive routines are anti-learning, overprotective, 
and self-sealing” (Argyris 1990, p. 25). These defensive routines are rooted in what Argyris 
and Schon call the Model I type of human behaviour summarized in Table 1. 
 
The four governing values in the left column of the table represent norms and interpretive 
schemas that underlie unproductive action strategies. As a result of these values, unintended 
consequences of action such as a manager being seen as defensive, inconsistent, or 
controlling occur. When this happens, it is difficult to enter into productive dialogue to 
question the underlying assumptions of a course of action. Eventually, this manager does not 
revise some faulty assumptions, leading to decreased long term effectiveness.  
 
Argyris and Schon distinguish between Model I social virtues (counter-productive behaviours 
that inhibit double loop learning) and Model II social virtues (complementary behaviours that 
facilitate double loop learning). These two models are described in Table 2. 
 
This model II theory-in-use is based on the governing values of “valid information”, 
“informed choice” and “individual responsibility to monitor how well the choice is 
implemented.” This individual responsibility includes monitoring how well one designs and 
implements his or her decisions in order to detect and correct errors. These governing values 
form the foundation for two action strategies: 
• Advocate one’s position and encourage inquiry or confirmation of it. This action 
strategy involves forthrightly expressing one’s views while providing illustrations of 
fairly observable data, e.g., what was seen and heard. The reason for doing so is to 
invite examination and discussion of the reasoning process that has led to one’s 
conclusion. 
• Minimization of unilateral face-saving. Actions taken to save face, for yourself or 
someone else, are considered an act of mistrust of the other person’s capacities. Such 
acts should be assessed.  
 
These action strategies have been found to lead to productive reasoning where individuals 
make their premises and inferences explicit and clear (Argyris 1990).  
The use of defensive routines as a lens helps us understand why actors may not be able to 
resolve contradictions inherent in organizational life.  
 
The use of defensive routines does have its limitations. For example, the theory of defensive 
routines assumes that organizational members altruistically want to solve the problems they 
see around them. It does not cater for situations where actors purposely act to fulfil their 
hidden agendas at the expense of the organization. 
 
 1195
Governing 
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Action Strategies Consequences for 
behavioural world 
Consequences 
for learning 
Effectivenes
s 
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overly concerned about 
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Self-sealing 
Maximize 
winning and 
minimize losing 
Own and control the task. 
(Claim ownership of the task, be 
guardian of the definition and 
execution of the task.) 
Defensive interpersonal 
and group relationship 
(dependence on actor, 
little helping of others).
Single-loop 
learning 
Minimize 
generating or 
expressing 
negative 
feelings  
Unilaterally protect yourself. 
(Speak in inferred categories 
accompanied by little or no 
directly observable data, be blind 
to impact on others and to 
incongruity between rhetoric and 
behaviour, reduce incongruity by 
defensive actions such as 
blaming, stereotyping, 
suppressing feelings, 
intellectualizing etc.)  
Defensive norms 
(mistrust, lack of risk-
taking, conformity, 
external commitment, 
emphasis on diplomacy, 
power-centred 
competition and 
rivalry). 
Little testing of 
theories publicly 
 
Much testing of 
theories privately 
Be rational Unilaterally protect others from 
being hurt (withhold 
information, create rules to 
censor information and 
behaviour, hold private 
meetings). 
Low freedom of choice, 
internal commitment 
and risk-taking. 
 
Decreased 
long term 
effectiveness
Table 1 - Model I Theory-in-Use (adapted from Argyris et al. 1978) 
Model I Social Virtues Model II Social Virtues 
Help and Support 
Give approval and praise to others. Tell others what 
you believe will make them feel good about 
themselves. Reduce their feelings of hurt by telling 
them how much you care, and if possible, agree with 
them that the others acted improperly. 
Increase the others’ capacity to confront their own 
ideas, to create a window into their own mind, and to 
face their un-surfaced assumptions, biases, and fears 
by acting in these ways toward other people. 
Respect for Others 
Defer to other people and do not confront their 
reasoning or actions. 
Attribute to other people a high capacity for self-
reflection and self-examination without becoming so 
upset that they lose their effectiveness and their sense 
of self-responsibility and choice. Keep testing this 
attribution opening.  
Strength 
Advocate your position in order to win. Hold your own 
position in the face of advocacy. Feeling vulnerable is 
a sign of weakness.  
Advocate your position and combine it with inquiry 
and self-reflection. Feeling vulnerable while 
encouraging inquiry is a sign of strength.  
Honesty 
Tell other people no lies or tell others all you think and 
feel. 
Encourage yourself and other people to say what they 
know yet fear to say. Minimize what would otherwise 
be subject to distortion and cover-up of the distortion. 
Integrity 
Stick to your principles, values and beliefs. Advocate your principles, values and beliefs in a way 
that invites inquiry into them and encourages other 
people to do the same. 
Table 2 - Comparison between Model I and Model II Social Virtues (Argyris 1990), p. 106 - 107) 
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4. Research Method 
As was mentioned earlier, one of the authors studied Stark – one of many subsidiaries within 
the Solteria group - using critical ethnography. Ethnographic research has emerged as one 
important method for studying the social and organizational contexts of IS development and 
use (Harvey et al. 1995; Myers 1999). Critical ethnography is one particular kind of 
ethnographic research (Myers 1997).  
 
The data was obtained over a six-year period in total, from 1996-2001, with the most 
intensive period of fieldwork being from August 1999 to August 2000.   Data sources 
included interviews, informal chats, meetings, observation, the company’s Intranet, and 
various documents such as e-mails, annual reports, and newspaper articles.  
One hundred and five formal interviews were conducted (most of which were audio taped) 
with 69 people. Many informal discussions with employees also took place. As well as 
interviews, meetings were attended at various levels and departments.  
 
5. Enterprise Integration at Stark 
Stark is a small-to-medium sized enterprise within a large conglomerate within the Asia-
Pacific region (called Solteria). Solteria was one of the global 500 companies with annual 
revenues of more than US$4 billion. The organisation structure of the Solteria empire for the 
year 2000 is shown in the next figure. 
 
 
Solteria
Figure 3 - Organizational Structure of Solteria Limited (2000) 
 
Stark employs around 700 people and is now comprised of five businesses: CamCo, MaxCo, 
HinoCo, DrinCo and ModCo. Prior to November 1999, Xenon was also part of Stark.  
 
1993 - A Change of Strategy 
In February 1993 David Callon assumed the role of general manager of Stark. Prior to his 
arrival, the three business units ⎯ MaxCo, Xenon and CamCo ⎯ were merged to form a new 
entity: Stark Industries Limited. An enterprise integration movement now began at Stark. 
Stark was restructured along regional lines to achieve greater market awareness and customer 
focus (this was in contrast to the previous emphasis on production). With the reorganization 
also came the consolidation of administrative centres. 
 
Under David Callon there was a change of strategy for the company. It was decided that 
Stark would not longer focus on production, but would become the marketing arm of the 
SEKTOR Group of companies. Stark would focus on the creation of new markets, the 
Sharpe Associates
Konstructor General Products
CeremCo Xenon Stark
Industries Limited
PipeCo RockCo
SEKTOR Manufacturing
Flavion Division BlackBird Industries Trimark Limited
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transformation of its product-oriented mindset and culture to one of providing customers with 
end-user system solutions, and differentiation through better service. Stark believed that it 
had to transform itself from a traditional product-focused business to a service-oriented 
business. 
 
After this strategic review, Stark undertook many projects with the aim of developing a new 
corporate identity, developing new corporate capabilities, and changing the organization. One 
of these was a Strategic Information Technology Project (SITP). 
 
1995 - The ERP Project 
The Strategic Information Technology Project was undertaken from June 1994 to May 1995 
and was assisted by a large global consulting company (herein called BigFive Consulting). 
Stark recognized that the information systems of Stark needed to be linked to its strategic 
business plan. 
 
The primary objective of the SITP was “to achieve greater integrity, reliability, timeliness 
and usefulness of information available to Stark management.” The SITP team with the help 
of BigFive Consulting recommended that “Stark seek an integrated packaged software 
product to support all if not most of the business functions.” The new system was expected to 
support a new re-engineered process, namely, the centralized order acceptance and delivery 
process for Stark. This would involve a new centralized order acceptance and delivery centre 
that would centralize order acceptance and delivery across MaxCo, CamCo and Xenon.  
After a long software search period, Stark selected DAREA (a pseudonym for one of the top 
five ERP vendors in the world). 
 
The new system was chosen to support a corporate culture and work environment that was 
yet to be created. This new corporate world would involve the consolidation not only of 
plants within CamCo (that were currently competing against each other) but also of the three 
main businesses of Stark. These sister businesses did not get along well with each other. 
Traditionally, most of the companies within the Solteria empire were fairly autonomous. The 
Solteria conglomerate as a whole had a cultural norm of commensurate authority, 
responsibility and accountability at the business unit level.  
 
However, this cultural norm was now diametrically opposed to what was proposed with the 
new ERP system. The new system would require a certain degree of cooperation and process 
standardization. 
 
Old-timers versus New-timers 
At the highest level of Stark, there were two groups: the New-timers and the Old-timers. The 
New-timers were comprised of the then general manager of Stark, David Callon, and several 
senior managers. The New-timers believed that new technology was needed to improve the 
business.  
 
The Old-timers believed the business was as simple as it always had been. Therefore, these 
new initiatives served only to over-complicate the business. In their opinion, there were only 
a few fundamental things one needed to do to run the business well. 
 
Wyatt Dunkins, the current leader of the Old-timers, had been with the Stark since the early 
1980s and had been part of the team that expanded the business. He was considered one of 
the most powerful figures in Stark.  
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1997-1998: The Strategic Debates 
Although Stark had yet to fully implement its new ERP system, there were debates at senior 
levels of Solteria and Flavion on the fundamental role that Stark would play within the Sector. 
Wyatt Dunkins, one of the Old-timers, lobbied for a change in Stark’s strategic role and 
enterprise integration strategy with the CEOs of SEKTOR and Flavion. He argued that the 
three main businesses of Stark should be managed in a more separate manner. The end result 
of these debates was a decision to change Stark from a marketing arm of SEKTOR to that of 
production i.e. back to what it was before! In late 1998 Gene Romm succeeded David Callon 
as the new CEO of Stark. 
 
[The change of Stark’s strategic role has] certainly taken place since I left [in 
December 1998].  But [it was] starting to take place a little bit over the 
implementation [of] Project Bridge.  We’re challenging, at senior levels in Solteria 
about what role Stark was to have inside the SEKTOR [group of companies] – 
whether it was about strategic growth or whether it was just an operating unit that was 
at the end of the value chain and we wanted to keep it tight and simple. (Interview 
with David Callon, General Manager of Stark from 1993 to 1998, 16 February 2001) 
 
1999: New Leader, Different Vision 
Gene Romm did not share the same integrated company vision as David Callon. Instead of a 
tightly integrated company, Gene Romm espoused a clearer separation between MaxCo, 
CamCo and the individual businesses of Stark. This stood in contrast to the previous CEOs 
view that Stark’s businesses should be tightly coordinated. The previous enterprise 
integration strategy for Stark was starting to unravel. 
 
2000: Post-Implementation 
By the end of 1999, Stark had managed to roll-out DAREA throughout the whole country. 
However, Stark employees generally hated DAREA. Worse, most senior managers believed 
that DAREA had been a bad investment. The new CEO of the SEKTOR group thought that 
DAREA was inferior to another ERP product usually widely throughout the group.  
 
In February 2000 the Stark ERP Support team considered various options to upgrade 
DAREA to a later version. However, given the latest business strategy for Stark, they decided 
to move towards splitting the “sales and distribution” tables shared by MaxCo and CamCo. In 
hindsight, they considered that these two businesses were too tightly integrated.  
 
In summary, we can see that David Callon, appointed CEO in 1993, had a strategy of creating 
a tightly integrated, service-oriented company. DAREA was chosen and implemented to 
support that strategy. However, David Callon, along with his strategy, left in 1999. Of the 
twelve managers who signed off the ERP project at the start, only three were left by 
December 2000.  
 
Now Stark had a new CEO and a new strategic vision. This strategic vision was diametrically 
opposed to David Callon’s vision, but almost identical to what it had been before he came 
along. This meant that DAREA was designed for a world that would never exist.  
 
“It didn’t take a 180 degree turn but it, sort of,  we were quite expansionist and 
visionary and we came back to a very conservative operational [focus] and … so it 
wasn’t a dramatic change but it was more a degree of how expansionist we would 
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have been had we wound the dial back a little bit to be more conservative.  But that – 
that did have an implication on [the] DAREA [project] and would we have chosen 
DAREA or a similar ERP system if we had the more conservative vision?  Probably 
not.” (Interview with David Callon, initiator of the ERP project when he was the 
General Manager of Stark from 1993 to 1998, 27 July 2000, emphasis added) 
 
6. Analysis 
In this section we will analyze our data using three themes: conflict of strategic paradigms, 
influence of dominant actors, and organizational defensive routines. 
 
Conflict of Strategic Paradigms 
At a deeper level, one can observe a conflict of strategic paradigms between two opposing 
camps: the New-timers and Old-timers. The New-timers believed that Stark should compete 
on the basis of service and on-time delivery, whereas the Old-timers believed that Stark 
should complete on the basis of social capital accumulation and maintenance. Nowhere was 
this more evident than at the centralized order acceptance and delivery centre.  
 
The centre was the epitome of Stark’s enterprise integration efforts. By the end of 1999 the 
strategies of the New-timers had been inscribed into the centre’s processes and systems (c.f. 
Orlikowski 2000). However, the centre never achieved the results of the dream of integration. 
 
This was because the centre was designed to ensure on-time predictable product delivery as a 
key differentiator for competitive advantage. However, from time to time, Wyatt Dunkins or 
the Auckland Sales Manager (of the Old-timers) would force a large order through the 
already congested product delivery schedule to please a big customer. This was because, in 
his view, Stark depended on good social capital accumulation and maintenance with large 
customers. These customers would call up on one day and make demands that their order be 
put ahead of others. Wyatt Dunkins did not want to lose these big customers (and he was 
prepared to disadvantage smaller customers and disrupt the delivery schedule if needed). 
 
Just one year later, the reengineered centralized order acceptance and delivery centre was 
split. This put an end to the dream of “mission control” that was pursued by David Callon. 
The Old-timers had won. 
 
The influence of dominant actors 
After Stark was formed from its constituent businesses, the New-timers attempted to develop 
a single corporate identity and chose a new ERP system to support the vision of a more 
tightly integrated, service-oriented firm. However this vision, along with the new ERP system, 
was diametrically opposed to some entrenched social structures and the values of the Old-
timers. The Old-timers opposed the integration effort. 
 
But by the time Stark’s strategic role was changed back to being a production arm of the 
sector, DAREA had already been inscribed with the intentions of the New-timers. DAREA 
was like a freight train that was almost impossible to stop.  
 
Organizational Defensive Routines 
We suggest that overcoming organizational defensive routines may be important in 
information technology enabled enterprise integration projects. Strategic debates on 
important, conflicting and sensitive issues are often implicated in enterprise integration 
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efforts. We suggest that resolution of these debates is crucial for a company’s strategic 
objectives and competitive strategies to be realized in an enterprise system. 
 
Due to space constraints, we will focus on just one issue: the unresolved conflict between the 
strategies of the New-timers and Old-timers. The New-timers advocated competing via 
predictable on-time delivery, whereas the Old-timers advocated competing via accumulation 
and preservation of social capital. While one might argue that the pursuit of both strategies 
was not mutually exclusive, in Stark they were debated as such. This unresolved debate can 
be understood by drawing on the concepts of single loop learning, double loop learning and 
defensive routines (Argyris 1990; Argyris et al. 1978; Argyris et al. 1996). 
 
The next figure summarizes the two competing strategies as single loop learning systems that 
were never effectively resolved by undertaking double loop learning. Double loop learning 
could have helped Stark effectively address apparent but not fundamental contradictions 
between the two strategies. The unresolved strategic debate trickled down to the design and 
operations of the centralized order acceptance and delivery centre. 
 
Theory-of-action Strategies:  The sales & marketing, manufacturing and delivery of the 
product as the best means to achieve corporate goals
Norms:           Maintenance of patronage of big customers equals volume that in turn 
translates to maintenance of revenue streams
Assumptions: Serving large customers over time, that in turn develops social capital, is the 
most effective manner to maximize corporate effectiveness
Competitive Strategy 2: Competing on Social Capital
Process (Order Acceptance & Delivery)
Results
Theory-of-action Strategies: The sales & marketing, manufacturing and delivery of the
product as the best means to achieve corporate goals
Norms:           Predictable Reliable On-Time Delivery results in increased volume sold
Assumptions: By providing reliable on-time delivery to customers, Stark would differentiate 
themselves from its competitors
Errors
DetectedInputs
Single Loop Learning at the Strategic Level
Norms, Strategies & Assumptions
remain untouched by single loop learning
Competitive Strategy 1: Competing on Predictable On-Time Delivery
 
Figure 4 - Single Loop Learning at Stark that Results in Unresolved Competing Strategies 
In the figure above, both competitive strategies were concerned with the sales, marketing, 
manufacturing and delivery of the product to customers. However, the norms and 
assumptions of these two competitive strategies differed. With competitive strategy 1, the 
results of the order and delivery process are judged on whether on-time delivery has been 
achieved. This is based on the expectation that predictable reliable on-time delivery over time 
results in increased sales volume. With competitive strategy 2, the results of the order and 
delivery process are judged on whether Stark maintained or enhanced its social capital with 
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its big customers. The basic rationale of this strategy is that maintenance of social capital will 
eventually result in guaranteed future sales. With regard to the differences between the 
assumptions of the two competitive strategies, both appear diametrically opposed.  
 
It appears to us that both camps (the New Timers and the Old Timers) failed to resolve these 
conflicting strategies productively. The result was the non-achievement of the on-time 
delivery strategy and widespread dissatisfaction with the ERP system.  
 
It is widely recognized that the linkages between strategy, strategic objectives, key 
performance indicators and the capability accorded by the enterprise system are crucial in the 
realization of benefits in enterprise systems investments (Davenport 2000a; SAP 2001)). 
However, as the discussion above shows, unresolved strategic debates (cf. Argyris et al. 1996) 
may also lead to a waste of effort in integrating the enterprise. We suggest the lack of 
resolution of these debates may be due to organizational defensive routines that prevent 
mutual learning taking place. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper we have discussed the implementation of an enterprise system in a small-
medium sized organization within a large conglomerate within the Asia-Pacific region. We 
have seen that enterprise integration at Stark was a corporate battleground. Unfortunately, a 
strategically important debate within Stark was not resolved before the viewpoint of one 
party (the New-timers) was inscribed into Stark’s enterprise system. We have suggested that 
the resolution of this debate was hindered by organizational defensive routines. In our view, 
organizational defensive routines hindered the achievement of better understanding between 
parties to resolve strategically important issues. By the time the system went live, the 
company’s enterprise integration strategy had already changed. The end result was a new 
ERP system designed to support a future corporate world and work environment that never 
arrived. Given the prevalence of defensive routines and political power plays in 
organizational life (Argyris 1992; Argyris 1993; Argyris 1999), we believe our findings may 
be applicable across a wide range of organisations. Further research is needed to find out if 
failure to learn is a common feature of enterprise systems implementation efforts. 
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